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The Return of the State 
José E. Alvarez* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International lawyers are both indebted to and at war with 
the state. Although we acknowledge, as we must, that states 
remain the primary actors in creating, interpreting, and 
enforcing international rules, we usually make this point in 
passing—as we try to puncture, evade, eclipse or overtake 
sovereignty. As Martti Koskenniemi’s apology/utopia dialectic 
demonstrates, much of what we do attempts to reconcile the 
un-reconcilable.1 This is epitomized by our efforts to portray 
pacta sunt servanda as a bridge between unilateralism and 
multilateralism.2 We explain that states do not relinquish, but 
rather, exercise their sovereignty when they enter into a 
treaty.3 This was, of course, the rationale adopted by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Wimbledon 
case.4 
International lawyers largely define success in terms of 
states’ conviction of the Wimbledon rationale—by the victory of 
the supra—or multi—national over the parochial national. We 
 
* Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York 
University School of Law. This essay is an extended version of an address 
delivered on Nov. 20, 2010 at the University of Minnesota Law School. The 
author acknowledges the research assistance provided by the Filomen 
D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund. 
 1. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (demonstrating how 
international law’s effectiveness to depoliticize international relations is 
limited by being either “an irrelevant moralist Utopia or a manipulable façade 
for State interests.”). 
 2. See id. at 311 (describing pacta sunt servanda as the rule defining the 
binding force of consent in agreements). 
 3. Or as Jan Klabbers puts it, the contention is that the “state can 
become bound precisely because it is sovereign.” Jan Klabbers, Clinching the 
Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L EUR. L. 345, 
347 (1998). 
 4. See generally S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17) 
(establishing the principle that the right to enter into international 
engagements is an act of state sovereignty).  
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think of ourselves as greasing the wheels that drive global 
governance. This defines our professional outlook. Nearly all of 
our efforts involve encouraging states to delegate away some 
part of their “domestic jurisdiction.” We do this by appealing to 
states’ long-term self-interest, and especially by utilizing the 
multilateral side, transnational non-state actors (MNCs, NGOs, 
international civil servants, and even individuals as private 
attorney generals). Further, we enlist intra-state constituencies 
with discrete interests, such as traders of goods seeking to 
restrain the protectionist impulses of their own governments. 
Consequently, all of these courses of action can influence 
government policy-makers. 
Our efforts to promote multilateralism or inter-state 
cooperation in lieu of unilateral sovereign action cut across the 
public/private international law divide. We establish global 
institutions as diverse as the UN, UN specialized agencies, and 
international financial institutions to centralize states’ talents 
and resources or to supply needed supra-national neutrality 
and independence.5 We promote these international 
organizations on the premise that they fulfill needs that each 
state cannot satisfy on its own.6 The age of international 
organizations rests on the assumption that states, like first 
year law students, should not travel alone. However, even 
though global governance serves the needs of states, getting 
them to accept the Wimbledon premise in discrete contexts has 
not always been easy—for example, when a treaty imposes 
unexpected or, given changing circumstances, temporally 
inconvenient, obligations.7 
 
 5. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through 
Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 14, 16 (1998) 
(describing the increased efficiencies derived from the “hierarchical” 
organization of IOs, in which the supervisory tasks are held by member states. 
Also, the independence of IOs preserves their effectiveness in achieving valued 
ends). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 4 (providing examples of how states prefer to use IOs 
as vehicles of cooperation. For instance, IOs provide collective security (the 
UN Security Council), solve coordination problems (such as those solved by 
ICAO with respect to aviation), arbitrate/adjudicate disputes, solve prisoners’ 
dilemmas too numerous to mention, or address threats posed by non-state 
actors like pirates and terrorists). 
 7. Revealingly, political scientists have argued that governments resist 
hard commitments because of perceived “sovereignty costs.” See Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421, 436-41 (2000). Revealingly, political scientists have argued 
that governments resist hard commitments because of perceived “sovereignty 
costs.” 
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For the builders of global governance, state sovereignty is 
most often a hindrance that needs to be overcome. It is not the 
favored ordering mechanism among today’s leading thinkers of 
global governance, and as a result, there is an increasing 
tendency to reduce or eliminate its application.8 For those 
focused on states’ threats to the human rights of their citizens, 
such as the late great Louis Henkin, sovereignty was the hated 
“S” word that needed to be banned from polite lawyerly 
discourse.9 Global and regional human rights systems respond 
almost entirely to the threat that sovereignty, unabated and 
unrestrained, poses.10 Those who strengthened the GATT’s 
weak dispute settlement scheme at the Uruguay Round devised 
end-runs around state sovereignty, such as the reverse 
consensus rule that makes WTO panel and Appellate Body 
rulings binding.11 The WTO’s house rests on the proposition 
that leaving matters to bilateral diplomatic leverage would 
impoverish us all.12 Even modern regimes built on 
bilateralism—such as that governing international 
investment—turned to bilateral treaties only after various 
multilateral efforts failed.13 Bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) are efforts by states to bind themselves to the mast to 
avoid the tempting sirens calling for breaches of investment 
contracts or nationalizations without compensation.14 BITs also 
 
 8. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 3, at 346 (noting as examples Anne-
Marie Slaughter’s network of transnational regulators and John Tasioulas’s 
defense of community values). 
 9. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, ASIL NEWSLETTER (Am. 
Soc’y Int’l Law, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 1993, at par. 11, available at 
http:///www.asil.org/pres.htm. 
 10. See id. par. 8 (indicating that state sovereignty is subject to the social 
contract in the UN Charter). 
 11. See WTO Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settl
ement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (identifying that reverse 
consensus occurs “when the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] establishes 
panels, when it adopts panel and Appellate Body reports and when it 
authorizes retaliation, the DSB must approve the decision unless there is a 
consensus against it.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment 
Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 612 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al eds., 
2011)(providing an opinion of BITs as being “‘contracts of adhesion’ imposed 
on the willing poor by the rich.”). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 625 (indicating how “by the end of 2008, more countries 
had entered into at least one investment protection agreement (179 countries) 
than had joined the WTO.”). 
 14. See id. at 620 n.68 (describing BITs as reliable “commitment devices” 
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involve relinquishments of sovereign “policy space” in deference 
to the greater good.15 
The papers presented at this conference on “International 
Economic Law in a Time of Change” demonstrate that the 
global governance tradition—and the urge to defend and 
improve it–is alive and well. A number of these papers continue 
to propose, in the best tradition carved out by those “present at 
the creation,” new forms of supra-national governance, needed 
reforms to harden international regulation, or ways to fill 
regulatory gaps with more law. Included in this category are 
the articles of Adam Feibelman (who addresses the problem of 
unmanaged exchange rates),16 Aldo Caliarai and Ioana 
Ciobanasu (on needed reforms for the IMF),17 Galit Sarfaty (on 
the need to harmonize anti-corruption efforts among 
multilateral development banks),18 Sarah Woo (on the need for 
regulatory reforms to respond to a group of non-state actors, 
namely credit rating agencies),19 Markus Wagner (on how to 
improve the WTO’s handling of disputes involving analysis of 
scientific evidence),20 Janelle Diller (on the need for greater 
complementarity with respect to applicable regimes on 
international product standards),21 Andrea Schneider and 
 
since they extend protection in the absence of a contract and offer greater 
protection than political risk insurance). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 627 (demonstrating how the benefits of foreign 
investment come at the cost of decreased sovereignty through the granting of 
reciprocal rights to all investors). 
 16. Adam Feibelman, The IMF and the Future of International Monetary 
Law (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law). 
 17. Aldo Caliari, Updating the International Monetary System to Respond 
to Current Global Challenges: Can It Happen Within the Existing Legal 
Framework?, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011); Ioana C. Ciobanasu, 
Expanded Mandate for the IMF: Global Financial Stability 20 MINN. J. INT’L. 
L. ONLINE (forthcoming 2011). 
 18. Galit Sarfaty, Abstract, Harmonization of Anti-Corruption Efforts 
Among Multilateral Development Banks (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 19. Sarah P. Woo, Super Disclosure is Not Enough: Examining the 
Benefits and Costs of New Credit Rating Regulations (Nov. 11, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law). 
 20. Markus Wagner, Abstract, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages 
of Law and Science in WTO Proceedings (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 21. Janelle M. Diller, The Interaction of Private International 
Standardization with Public International Law (Nov. 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
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Nancy Welsh (on whether the investment regime can be 
improved by a greater reliance on mediation),22 and Krista 
Nadakavukaren Schefer (on the likely impact of R2P for 
international economic regimes).23 Others explore lesser known 
reaches of global governance, such as Michelle Badin’s look at 
the impact of the WTO’s dispute settlement system on the civil 
aircraft sector,24 or Doak Bishop and Ben Love’s analysis of the 
use of soft law by investor-state arbitrators.25 Some see new 
forms of global governance or describe old ones in new ways. 
For instance, Claire Kelly and Sungjoon Cho describe the G20 
as the helm of a new global governance order that intersects 
with the WTO, UNCTAD and OECD.26 David Zaring compares 
global regimes that deploy rule-making techniques with those 
who use adjudication.27 Some, like Jessica Lawrence, Gareth 
Davies and Laurens Ankersmit, Elizabeth Trujillo, and 
Valentina S. Vadi explore fragmentations dilemmas posed by 
our disparate schemes for global governance.28 
Still others address the issue of why multilateral 
 
 22. Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Application of Dispute 
System Design Principles and Procedural Justice Theories to the Potential 
Use of Mediation and Other Consensual Processes in the Investor-State 
Context (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law). 
 23. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Responsibility to Protect: A New 
Direction for International (Economic) Law? (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 24. Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Public and Private Actors Redefining 
the WTO Adjudicatory System Role in the Global Arena: Examples from the 
Civil Aircraft Business (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law). 
 25. R. Doak Bishop & Ben Love, Abstract, The Increasing Influence of 
Soft Law in International Disputes (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 26. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global 
Governance: A Case of the G20(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 27. David Zaring, Developing Paradigms For Thinking About 
International Financial Regulation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 28. Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence & Gareth Davies, Diverging EU 
and WTO Perspectives on Extraterritorial Process Regulation (Nov. 4, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law); Elizabeth Trujillo, Abstract, Tuna/Dolphin Revisited: Trade 
Implications for Climate Change Regulation (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law); Valentina S. Vadi, 
Abstract, Unity in Diversity? Cultural Diversity Disputes and the Judicial 
Function in International Economic Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
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regulation continues to elude us in distinct areas. This includes 
Odette Lienau’s look at how basic notions of sovereignty 
constrain our solutions to sovereign debt problems,29 Alexandra 
Koutoglidou’s exploration of how immunity from execution, as 
“the last fortress, the last bastion of [s]tate immunity,”30 
continues to hinder international arbitral mechanisms, 
Chunbao Liu’s examination of the challenges faced by those 
who seek to liberalize international labor flows,31 Caroline 
Bradley’s enumeration of the hazards of ad hoc efforts to 
develop transnational standards for financial regulation,32 and 
Shashank Kumar and Mehana Sharafudeen’s critical view of 
certain national laws seeking to protect intellectual property 
through extraterritorial effect.33 Most of these authors take 
Henkin to heart; they too see the “S” word as a troublesome 
hindrance. 
A closer look at some of the papers presented at this 
conference, however, suggests some cross-currents at odds with 
the expected Grotian narrative. Some of their authors describe, 
but do not endorse, the particular global regimes under 
consideration. Jide Nzelibe (who writes of the unholy alliance 
between Republicans and Democrats in the United States that 
has led to differing results with respect to U.S. participation in 
multilateral regimes),34 Julian Ku (who criticizes judicial 
assumptions on the status of corporations),35 Jason Yackee 
(who questions whether BITs promote flows of foreign direct 
 
 29. Odette Lienau, Emerging Norms of Sovereignty in International Debt 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law). 
 30. Alexandra Koutoglidou, Abstract, Foreign Investors’ Right Of Access 
To International Justice vs. State Immunity From Execution (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 31. Chunbao Liu, Abstract, Liberalizing Labour Mobility Through 
Regional Trade Agreements: The Experience of China (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 32. Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational 
Standard-Setting, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011). 
 33. Shashank P. Kumar & Meghana Sharafudeen, Abstract, 
Extraterritoriality of Intellectual Property Law in an Era of Globalization: The 
Doctrine of “Manufacturing Fiction” and Goods in Transit (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 34. Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law as an 
Extension of Domestic Political Conflict (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 35. Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International 
Law (Nov. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law). 
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investment),36 and Anu Bradford and Travis Bradford (who 
contend that multilateral negotiations on climate change are 
self-defeating),37 evince no enthusiasm for the international 
regimes they address. 
A number of the presenters remind us of the serious gaps—
in coverage or effectiveness—of our existing forms of global 
governance, but do not propose that we fill these with more 
global law. Aunpam Chander, for example, addresses the 
problems of regulating cloud computing by focusing on very 
traditional conflict of laws questions, namely, which territory is 
best suited to address the question.38 Some presenters appear 
to be entertaining second thoughts about the turn to global 
governance itself, questioning whether additional global 
regulation or binding international adjudication is really a good 
idea. Juscelino Colares, who identifies the limits of WTO 
adjudication as a source of the regime’s strength,39 Alexia 
Marks, who outlines the beneficial deterrence impact of 
national product liability laws,40 Jarrod Wong, who examines 
the bottom-up aspects of clawback statutes on corporate 
governance without need for international regulation,41 or 
Joseph Yackey, who suggests that extraterritorial national 
regulation for passive corruption might be a good idea,42 fall 
into this camp. 
Some presenters echo my theme here, namely that states 
are staging a comeback. Tania Voon’s and Andrew Mitchell’s 
 
 36. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence (Mar. 22, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law). 
 37. Anu Bradford & Travis Bradford, The Peril of a Weak Climate Treaty: 
When Markets Will Do (Nov. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 38. Anupam Chander, Abstract, Law in the Cloud (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 39. Juscelino F. Colares, The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance 
the Problem? (Oct. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 40. Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Evaluating the Means of 
Deterrence in the Food Industry (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 41. Jarrod Wong, The International Phenomenon of Clawbacks 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law). 
 42. Joseph W. Yackey, Abstract, Passive Corruption and Transnational 
Firms: A Regulatory Analysis (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
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paper on the Australian federal government’s efforts to 
establish a company, majority owned by the government, to 
deliver superfast broadband services,43 signals that even with 
respect to that most “global” of phenomena—the web—states 
are not helpless supplicants beholden to external developments 
and forms of regulation. Their paper reminds us that countries 
such as China appear to be surprisingly resilient when it comes 
to protecting themselves as sovereigns from the web’s effects. 
Similarly, Efraim Chaiamish’s paper on “state-run 
capitalism”44 illustrates that states continue to exist as 
economic actors as a result, or independently of, the global 
economic crisis. Despite the rise of the market, states have not 
been privatized out of the picture. Mariana Prado’s study of 
Brazilian privatization efforts with respect to the electricity 
versus telecommunications sectors takes us even further.45 It is 
second-generation privatization scholarship, which 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding global efforts to encourage 
privation, governments retain considerable discretion 
regarding privatization and whether their actions remain 
subject to transnational scrutiny.  
My own theme—the return of the state—is most directly 
suggested by Koutoglidou’s paper on sovereign immunity,46 
Yackee’s questioning the desirability of BITs,47 and the work of 
Alvaro Santos, Nicole Foster, and John Baloro, which critiques 
international development policy from the perspective of the 
“South.”48 Some of these authors remind us that the 
 
 43. Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, International Trade Law Implications 
of Australia’s National Broadband Network (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 44. EfraimChaiamish, Abstract, International Law and State Capitalism 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law). 
 45. Mariana Mota Prado, Transnational Influences on National 
Regulatory Reform in Large Developing Countries: Brazil's Contrasting 
Experiences in Electricity and Telecommunications Governance (Nov. 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law). 
 46. Koutoglidou, supra note 30. 
 47. Yackee, supra note 36. 
 48. Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries 
in the WTO (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law); Nicole D. Foster, Abstract, The WTO, Developing 
Countries and the Problem of Development (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law); John Baloro, Abstract, The 
BIT Gold Rush: Emerging Voices of Dissent from the South with Specific 
Reference to the Experience of South Africa (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
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international investment regime—the contemporary regime 
that has displaced the WTO among critics of globalization and 
has been seen as the greatest threat to sovereignty—is actually 
in the throes of serious sovereign backlash. The regime most 
criticized for ignoring the will of states49 has become the 
foremost example of their persistent power. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME AND SOVEREIGNTY 
The United States established its BIT program in the 
1980s.50 Though a latecomer to the investment regime, when 
the United States decided to join the movement away from 
trade-oriented treaties of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCNs)—whose raison d’etre was undercut by the 
emergence of the GATT—to investment protection agreements, 
it elevated investor protection to a new high. The United 
States’ early Model BITs of 1984-87 were the most investor-
protective in the world.51 Those treaties deployed every 
lawyerly device imaginable to achieve a single unitary object 
and purpose: to protect the foreign investor. Unlike many of the 
earlier European BITs, the U.S. Model BITs of 1984-87 
protected the entry and post-entry treatment of investment.52 
These treaties gave investors the better of national and most 
favored treatment, subject only to delimited sectoral 
exceptions; provided additional assurances against any other 
discriminatory or arbitrary treatment; gave investors a treaty 
right to demand access to national court remedies; accorded 
them the better of any treatment accorded under national law, 
customary international law, and the absolute guarantees of 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
 
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law). 
 49. See, e.g., Press Release, Osgoode Hall Law School of Law, Public 
Statement on the International Investment Regime, at (Aug. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/. (expressing 
concern regarding the “hampering of the ability of governments to act for their 
people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental 
sustainability.”). 
 50. For a description of the origins of the U.S. BIT program, see Kenneth 
J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 7–43 (1992). 
 51. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 4 TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTE MGMT. 1, 2–6 (2010) (recalling the 1984 Model BIT’s history and 
impact ). 
 52. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 50, at 35 (remarking on concern that a 
tougher US BIT would be hard to negotiate when countries were familiar with 
the weaker European version). 
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security;” extended the Hull Rule assuring prompt, adequate 
and effective payment if expropriated to all measures, 
including indirect regulatory acts that were “tantamount to 
expropriation;” included a comprehensive umbrella clause that 
turned all breaches of host state-investor contracts into treaty 
breaches; and provided an iron-clad guarantee that violations 
of any of these rights could be taken at the option of the 
investor to international arbitration, notwithstanding any 
clause to the contrary in the investors’ contract with the host 
state.53 The U.S. Model BIT of that period set out to regulate 
the state. It set a new standard for investor protection that 
became widely emulated when the Berlin Wall fell and 
countries donned Thomas Friedman’s “golden straightjacket”54 
as everyone sought to at least appear a capitalist.55 Most of the 
U.S. BIT’s measures to protect investors became standard 
during the golden age of the proliferation of BITs, namely the 
1990s.56 
Foreign investment protection is now practiced globally. 
Today, some 3000 international investment agreements (IIAs) 
exist, including BITs and investment chapters in free trade 
agreements (FTAs).57 More countries are party to at least one 
BIT than are members of the WTO.58 BITs are not just popular 
with Western capital exporting nations. Today’s leading BIT 
nations include China and Egypt, as even developing nations 
have multilateral enterprises requiring protection elsewhere.59 
 
 53.  José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Investment Regime, in 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 616 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, et al. eds.,) (forthcoming 
2011). 
 54. See Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 101–11 (First Anchor Books 2000). 
 55. See Alvarez, supra note 53, at 614-23. 
 56. Id.; See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 
U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, Y.B. ON 
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009 283, 284 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009). 
 57. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010, 
World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, 81–82 
[hereinafter World Investment Report 2010] (available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf). 
 58. See, e.g., Trade and Development Board: Investment, Enterprise and 
Development Commission Multi-Year Expert Meeting on Investment for 
Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, Feb. 10-12, 2009, The Development 
Dimension of International Investment Agreements, 2, TD/B/C.II/MEM.3/2 
(Dec. 2, 2008) (noting that 179 countries had entered into at least one 
investment protection agreement through 2008).  
 59. See, e.g., Lisa E. Sachs and Karl P. Sauvant, “BITs, DTTs, and FDI 
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Cuba has concluded more BITs than the U.S.,60 and today, 
about a third of the total number of IIAs have been concluded 
between developing states.61 Moreover, although the 
international investment regime consists largely of bilateral 
agreements, investment protections increasingly appear in 
multi-party agreements such as the Energy Charter62 and the 
CAFTA.63 The rights accorded investors also find significant 
support in multilateral instruments promulgated by the OECD, 
and the advice and actions of the IFC, the World Bank, the 
IMF, and regional development banks. Indeed, one scholar 
plausibly portrays the IMF and its approach to conditionality 
as a de facto international investment regulator.64 
These international efforts also have a domestic 
component. As the annual UNCTAD surveys of domestic 
investment laws indicate, since 1992 when these studies began, 
the vast proportion of new regulatory changes were—consistent 
with the proliferation of BITs—“liberalization” or “promotion” 
measures.65 Throughout the 1990s, UNCTAD characterized 
over 90 percent of national regulatory changes as intended to 
be more hospitable to aliens with capital.66 In addition, starting 
in the mid-1990s but especially since 2000, the amount of 
investment treaty arbitrations disclosed to the public have 
dramatically increased.67 Today, with over 350 known investor-
state claims either pending or concluded,68 the driving force of 
international investment law is not the proliferation of treaties 
or the adoption of liberalizing national laws, but is rather, the 
ever more abundant (and usually effective) arbitral awards. 
 
Flows: An Overview,” in The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment 
xxvii, at xxx fig. 8 (Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, ed. 2009) (table of ten 
countries with highest number of BITs).  
 60. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 178, 181. 
 61. Id. at 177-81. 
 62. See generally About the 1994 Energy Charter, ENERGY CHARTER, 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28. 
 63. See generally Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta. 
 64. See Daniel Kalderimis, IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: 
A Theoretical Analysis, 13 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 104, 113-119 (2004).Daniel 
Kalderimis, “IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical 
Analysis,” 13 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 104, at 113-19 (2004). 
 65. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 76 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 84. 
 68. Id. 
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These rulings have considerably elaborated the bare bones 
guarantees contained in BITs or FTAs.  
History, however, did not stop with the end of the Cold 
War. As Yackee’s paper in particular reminds us, the 
international investment regime has been the victim of its own 
success and is buffeted by opposing cross currents.69 The 
proliferation of investor-state disputes have come with a price: 
many of the states that established the regime are having 
second thoughts about the amount of sovereign “policy space” 
they have ceded. Many are exercising some of their exit and 
voice options (this includes, as we shall see, most prominently 
the regime’s once most prominent cheerleader, the United 
States, which is, at this writing, among the most frequent 
respondent states under investor-state dispute settlement).70 
To be sure, states have not stopped concluding BITs and they 
have not ceased making their national laws and practices 
investor-friendly. Over the course of 2009 alone, states 
concluded eighty-two new BITs along with another twenty 
IIAs.71 UNCTAD’s latest report of national policy developments 
tells us that in that year, of 102 policy measures affecting FDI, 
a little less than 70 percent supported its liberalization and 
promotion.72 
At the same time, the report indicates that more than 30 
percent of national policy changes surveyed were in the 
opposite direction, providing for greater regulation and 
restriction, the highest proportion since UNCTAD began its 
surveys in 1992.73 UNCTAD’s examples of these restrictions 
reveal how some countries are re-asserting their “sovereign 
rights” vis-à-vis foreign investors. Measures enacted in 2009 
that restricted the entry of foreign investors included Algeria’s 
new requirement of a 49 percent equity share limit on foreign 
investors seeking to produce for the domestic market; 
Australia’s tightening of its rules on foreign investment in 
residential real estate; and Canada’s and Germany’s revisions 
 
 69. Yackee, supra note 36. 
 70.  According to UNCTAD, by the end of 2009, the number of countries 
subject to known investor-state claims stood at eighty-one (including 489 
developing countries, 17 developed countries and 15 economies in transition). 
World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 83.  
 71. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 82.  
 72. Id., at 76. 
 73. By comparison, according to UNCTAD’s annual surveys, in 2000 only 
2 percent of national investment measures were non-liberalizing or restrictive. 
Id. fig.III.1. 
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to their respective laws to authorize governmental review of 
investments that impair or threaten national security.74 
Meanwhile, measures in that year adversely affecting 
established investors included Bolivia’s nationalization of 
several electric generation companies; Venezuela’s 
nationalization of a foreign controlled bank; Indonesia’s 
requirement for divestment of foreign investments in mining to 
local parties; Kazakhstan’s imposition of Kazakh content 
requirements and its requirement that Kazakh service provides 
need to employ no less than 95 percent Kazakh nationals; and 
Nigeria’s domestic content requirements with respect to oil and 
gas.75 
Furthermore, the fact that many states continue to enter 
into BITs or FTAs is a bit misleading. The most recent crop of 
these treaties tends not to resemble the investor-protective U.S. 
Model BIT of 1984. Instead, many recent investment protection 
treaties accord FDI host states greater room to maneuver,76 
while simultaneously granting foreign investors fewer rights.77 
The changes to the U.S. Model BIT over time—clearly 
manifested if we use the language of the U.S. Model BIT of 
1984 for comparison, from the heyday of investor-protection, to 
the considerably more hedged terms of its Model BIT of 2004—
suggest what is happening elsewhere.78 If the United States led 
the charge in favor of investor protections, it now appears to be 
leading the drive in the opposite direction. The 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT is at least twice as long as it once was—and as every 
lawyer knows, the length of a treaty is often inversely related 
to the rights that it accords. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT has now 
shrunk, sometimes dramatically, virtually every right 
originally accorded to foreign investors while at the same time 
increasing, sometimes vastly, the discretion accorded host 
states. That Model: 
 “re-balances” through preamblar language and 
exceptions, the rights accorded investors in favor of 
states’ rights to protect health, safety, and the 
environment; 
 
 74. Id. at 80 box III.4 
 75. Id., box III.5. 
 76. See, e.g., OECD, Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent 
Investment Agreements: An Overview, 12 Dec. 2005, para. 10. 
 77. See, e.g., id. para. 1577. 
 78. For a comparison chart of the two texts, see Annex A, supra note 51, 
at 22–32.  
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 narrows the definition of covered investment by, for 
example, excluding some forms of debt or licenses; 
 narrows national and MFN treatment by, for example, 
imposing fewer constraints on the sectors that a state 
can exclude from such obligations, exempting local 
government measures, and by indicating that the MFN 
clause in post 2004 BITs does not provide investors 
under them the right to claim any better rights 
accorded under the US’s older BITs; 
 eliminates the additional protection against arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures; 
 eliminates the umbrella clause; 
 reduces the scope of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security guarantees to those which 
would have been accorded under the “customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens;” 
 omits the old provision assuring investors’ rights to 
pursue claims in national courts; 
 excludes from investor-state dispute settlement any 
claims based on denial of transparency in 
administrative proceedings; 
 restricts the scope of cognizable regulatory takings 
claims, indicating that “except in rare circumstances,” 
non-discriminatory regulatory actions taken to protect 
public welfare do not constitute an indirect taking; 
 requires investors to first seek the approval of 
government tax authorities before taking certain 
investment claims based on tax measures to 
arbitration; 
 otherwise restricts the ambit of investment arbitrators’ 
discretion and/or elevating the costs of bringing such 
claims by imposing new 90 day notice of claims, a three 
year statute of limitations, and new transparency and 
participation requirements; 
 permits the state parties to the treaty to issue binding 
interpretations of their agreement, even in anticipation 
of known claims or in the course of pending 
arbitrations; 
 permits state parties to invoke much more expansive 
exceptions to justify measures “relating to financial 
services for prudential reasons;” “in pursuit of 
monetary and related credit policies or exchange rate 
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policies;” and to protect their “essential security.”79 
As a result of these changes, it is hard to say exactly what 
the object and purpose of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT is. The 
combination of the changes to its preamble, more restricted 
investor rights, and its more expansive list of state exceptions, 
suggest that its object and purpose now includes the right of 
host states to regulate as they please. The elevation of the 
power of the host state is perhaps most evident with respect to 
the United States’ efforts to clarify that a state’s decision to 
invoke “essential security” to justify any measure, no matter 
how detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, is a non-
reviewable, self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible.80 
As with respect to its pro-investor Model predecessor, the 
United States is influencing other countries’ Model BITs by the 
power of its example. If the world’s leading capital exporter, the 
state responsible for establishing the Hull Rule, for discrediting 
the Calvo Clause, and for creating a perfected investor-state 
arbitration clause is now emphasizing the need to protect its 
sovereign prerogatives, others are sure to follow. They have. 
The latest Canadian Model Investment Protection Treaty 
closely resembles the 2004 U.S. Model,81 and many of the 
sovereign-protective innovations in post-2004 U.S. investment 
agreements are now appearing in recent Chinese treaties, 
including those between China and Mexico, China and New 
Zealand, and China and India.82 UNCTAD’s latest investment 
 
 79. See Alvarez, supra note 51, at 9-11. 
 80. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, art. 18 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (permitting a state 
party to take measures “which it considers” necessary to protect its “essential 
security”). Note that the self-judging nature of this exception is made even 
more express in the 2006 Peru-U.S. FTA which, in addition, provides that “if a 
party invokes [the essential security clause] in an arbitral proceeding . . . the 
tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception applies.” 
U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, June 28, 2007, 22-1 n.2 (available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/ 
asset_upload_file841_9542.pdf). For a discussion of the evolving position of the 
U.S. toward the “essential security” exception contained in its investment 
treaties, see José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and 
Foreign Investors: A Glimpse Into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in Y.B. 
ON INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009 379, 421–24 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).  
 81. Compare Canada 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ Canadian2004-FIPA-model-
en.pdf), with 2004 U.S. Model BIT, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizati
on/ 117601.pdf.  
 82. Alvarez, supra note 51, at 12. 
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report tells us that Russia, France, Columbia, Mexico, Austria 
and Germany have all recently concluded a review process of 
their respective model BITs while comparable reviews are on-
going in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Morocco, Bolivia, 
South Africa and Turkey.83 In most cases, the stated reasons 
are to ensure consistency with the public interest, adjust the 
old model to new developments, and seek a “balance between 
protecting investor and host country.”84 Like the changes to the 
U.S. Model, more recent BITs include more general exceptions 
that allow host states greater regulatory space, restrictions (or 
“clarifications”) to specific investor rights, and greater carve 
outs from investor-state arbitration.85 
The power of the U.S. example has also been felt with 
respect to the screening of incoming foreign investment to 
protect the states’ “essential” or “national security” interests. 
The United States, which adopted an elaborate statutory 
scheme permitting the President to bar mergers and 
acquisitions involving foreign investors that pose such threats, 
strengthened its scrutiny over incoming investments after the 
Dubai Ports deal debacle and perceived threats from the entry 
of state-owned enterprises, particularly from China.86 As a 
result, in the United States today, more potential M&As 
involving a foreigner are scrutinized, delayed, or, in rare 
instances, derailed, under governmental scrutiny.87 Other 
states are following the U.S. lead in adopting or strengthening 
their own national security screening mechanisms.88 Countries, 
 
 83. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 85. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 86–88., 
 86. See, e.g., Mark E. Plotkin & David N. Fagan, Foreign Direct 
Investment and U.S. National Security: CFIUS Under the Obama 
Administration, 24 COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 24, June 7, 2010, 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/print/Fagan_and_Plotkin-_Final_0.pdf 
[hereinafter FDI and U.S. National Security]; Mark E. Plotkin & David N. 
Fagan, The Revised National Security Review Process for FDI in the US, 
COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 2, Jan. 7, 2009, 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/Perspective2-
PlotkinandFagan.pdf. 
 87. See FDI and U.S. National Security, supra note 86 (indicating that the 
United States has escalated the percentage of transactions that proceed to the 
second stage, a 45 day investigation before the CFIUS, and that the pace of 
such reviews has slowed down “materially” in 2009). 
 88. See, e.g., Subrata Bhattacharjee, National Security with a Canadian 
Twist: The Investment Canada Act and the New National Security Review 
Test, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No 10, July 30 2009, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/fi
les/ vale/print/ICA_Perspective-_Final.pdf. 
ALVAREZ - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:06 PM 
2011] THE RETURN OF THE STATE 239 
 
including the United States, tend not to adopt clear definitions 
of what exactly threatens their “security” or, particularly after 
9/11, transparent procedures for making such determinations. 
These factors, particularly when combined with the self-judging 
element essential to security clauses in BITs, threaten to 
eviscerate the right of entry once enjoyed by foreign investors 
(at least under older U.S. BITs). Of course, many countries, 
including Canada, have a long history of screening incoming 
foreign investment on a variety of other grounds; national 
security is merely the latest governmental tool.89 
BIT signatories have also found other ways to re-assert 
their sovereign prerogatives. In January 2008, Ecuador 
expressed its intention to withdraw from its BITS with Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Uruguay.90 That country’s 
constitutional court ruled another four BITs unconstitutional 
and Ecuador has further withdrawn from the ICSID 
Convention.91 Bolivia has similarly withdrawn from ICSID.92 
For its part, Venezuela, along with some of its Andean 
neighbors, has introduced significant changes to its national 
laws in derogation of the rights of foreign investors while 
refusing to renew its BIT with the Netherlands.93 Russia 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 85. 
 91. Id. at 85–86. Ecuador withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 
January 2010. Joshua M. Robbins, Ecuador Withdraws from ICSID 
Convention, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (12-Aug-2009), 
http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/2-422-1266. 
 92. For a discussion of the implications of Bolivia’s May 2, 2007 notice to 
the World Bank indicating its intent to withdraw from ICSID, see Marco E. 
Schnabl & Julie Bédard, The Wrong Kind of ‘Interesting’, NAT’L L. J. (London), 
Jul. 30, 2007 (available at http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/1910
231238362.pdf). For a description of other developments demonstrative of 
sovereign “backlash” against the investment regime, see, e.g., Karl P. Sauvant, 
Regulatory Risk and the Growth of FDI, in WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 
2011: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK 
67 (available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/WorldInvestmen
tProspectsto2011.pdf). 
 93. For an account of the changes in foreign investment laws in Venezuela 
and other Andean countries, see Leonardo Stanley, Natural Resources & 
Foreign Investors: A Tale of Three Andean Countries, WORKING GROUP ON 
DEV. & ENV’T IN THE AMERICAS, Discussion Paper 16 (April 2008), 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP16StanleyApr08.pdf. For an analysis of 
the implications of Venezuela’s termination of its BIT with the Netherlands, 
see Ramon Ramirez Quijada, The “Survival Clause” In the Netherlands-
Venezuelan BIT: A Salvation Gateway for Foreign Investment in the Oil Sector 
or a Curse for the Venezuelan Government?, CTR. FOR ENERGY, PETROLEUM & 
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decided not to become a party to the Energy Charter, while 
several European countries have abrogated intra-EU BITs.94 
Indeed, renegotiating old BITs is now keeping a number of 
foreign ministries busy.95 UNCTAD reports that nineteen BITs 
were renegotiated in 2009 alone, with the Czech Republic being 
the most active.96 
Nor is this the end of the story. At this writing, the U.S. 
Model BIT remains a work in progress and may continue to 
evolve. Back in the United States, the Obama Administration 
has suspended at least some pending BIT negotiations while it 
undertakes yet another review of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.97 A 
recent divided and inconclusive advisory committee report to 
the U.S. State Department makes it doubtful that the 
Administration will release a revised U.S. model any time 
soon.98 That report, like recent testimony before Congress, 
revealed sharp divisions between business representatives and 
the regime’s critics, including representatives of the labor 
movement, academics and NGOs.99 While business groups 
would welcome a return to the more investor-protective 
provisions of earlier U.S. Model BITs, others contend that the 
post-2004 changes to U.S. agreements do not go far enough to 
protect sovereign “policy space.”100 Some recommend adopting a 
general exceptions clause comparable to that in Article XX of 
the GATT, replacing absolute guarantees like fair and 
equitable treatment with a simple ban on discrimination, 
 
MINERAL L. & POL’Y, 1 (June 4, 2009), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/ 
gateway/files.php?file=CAR-12_29_262236660.pdf.  
 94. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 86. 
 95. See Ravinder Casley Gera, International Investment: End of the Boom? 
22 CHAMBERS MAGAZINE (London) (2007) (available at 
http://www.chambersmagazine.co.uk/Article/International-arbitration-
INVESTMENT-ARBITRATION---The-end-of-the-boom). 
 96. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 86. 
 97. See, e.g., “US Suspends Talks on BIT with Pakistan, PAK. TRIB. 
(Lahore), Sept. 17, 2010, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?231620
.http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print&id_article=18130http://www.b
ilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print&id_article=18130. 
 98. See Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory 
Committee on International Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/
othr/2009/131118.htm (“The key reality reflected very clearly in our twenty-
four page Subcommittee report is that our group was divided on 
the most fundamental question.”). 
 99. See id, annex B (providing viewpoints of subcommittee members). 
 100. See, e.g., id. (statement of Shaun Donnelly, Senior Dir. for Int’l Bus. 
Pol’y, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfg.). 
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requiring investors to exhaust local remedies prior to seeking 
international arbitration, or, most radical of all, eliminating 
investor-state dispute settlement altogether in deference to 
resolution by the local courts of the host state.101 
Business groups fear that at some point the effort to 
protect sovereign discretion will render a BIT negotiation an 
entirely pointless exercise. That such an outcome is possible is 
suggested by the example of Norway, which in 2007, released a 
model BIT so protective of Norway’s sovereign prerogatives to 
regulate that Norwegian business groups withdrew their 
support from the effort.102 Norway’s effort to please all sides 
ended with a suspended BIT program. For some, the 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT may have already gone too far in the direction of 
protecting sovereign discretion.103 Daniel Price, a former BIT 
negotiator, fears that changes to the U.S. Model will only lessen 
the value of these treaties; he argues that a BIT that merely 
affirms that investors have the right to be treated like all other 
national investors and have their rights decided only by local 
courts returns us to the days of Carlos Calvo, when South 
American states reacted to U.S. gunboat diplomacy in favor of 
U.S. investors by refusing to participate in international 
arbitration altogether.104 Despite Price’s fears, the odds are 
good that if the United States were to release a new model 
treaty, the starting point will be the 2004 model and more 
sovereignty-protective changes will be added. 
But if, as indicated, international investment law is driven 
by the jurisprudence produced by investment arbitrators, does 
that jurisprudence provide a firewall to protect foreign 
investors against trends in favor of “re-balancing?” This is far 
from clear. Consider, by way of example, three of the most 
recent annulment rulings rendered in the on-going saga of the 
 
 101. For background on the Subcommittee and the options being urged on 
the U.S. as it reviews its BIT program, see Kevin P. Gallagher, U.S. BITs and 
Financial Stability, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No 19, Feb. 23, 2010, 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/print/Gallagher-_Final.pdf. 
 102. See, e.g., Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Treaty News, (Int’l Inst. for 
Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), June 8, 2009, at 7, 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/ITN-June-2009.pdf.  
 103. See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of 
International Law, 3 Transnational Dispute Management, Apr. 2006 (online 
journal article at transnational-dispute-management.com). 
 104. See Daniel M. Price, Keep International Protections; Bilateral Treaties 
and Free Trade Agreements Are Key, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A17. 
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leading respondent state in investor-state arbitration, 
Argentina. All of these cases involved claims by U.S. companies 
operating privatized utilities in Argentina. In all cases, the 
underlying claims, involving alleged breaches of the umbrella 
clause, fair and equitable treatment, and expropriation clauses 
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, resulted from Argentina’s 
“emergency legislation,” adopted in response to the country’s 
economic and political crisis starting in 2001.105 In all cases, a 
principal issue concerned the interpretation of the treaty’s 
‘measures not precluded clause’ which permits state parties to 
take measures to maintain public order or to protect their 
essential security interests.106 The three underlying decisions 
under challenge before ICSID annulment committees involved 
the companies of CMS, Sempra, and Enron; all three had 
rendered multi-million dollar decisions in favor of the U.S. 
claimants.107 All three panels decided that the measures not 
precluded clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be read in 
light of the underlying customary defense of necessity, 
requiring states to demonstrate that any measures taken in 
response to an essential or grave peril were the “only” 
measures possible and that the state invoking such measures 
did not significantly contribute to the underlying peril.108 
The first annulment decision, in CMS, upheld the 
underlying award but not without extensive dicta indicating 
that had the scope of review been more generous and not 
restricted as it is under ICSID, they would have found the 
original panel’s ruling as to the meaning of the measures not 
precluded clause to have been erroneous.109 The CMS 
annulment committee opined that it was wrong to equate the 
 
 105. For a thorough description of these cases, see Alvarez & Khamsi, 
supra note 80, at 379–407.  
 106. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) [hereinafter 
U.S.-Arg. BIT].  
 107. Sempra Energy Int’l. v. Argentine Rep. (Sempra Decision), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, para. 486 (Sept. 28, 2007), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId =DC694_En&caseId=C8; Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, 
L.P. v. Argentine Rep. (Enron Decision), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 
para. 450 (May 22, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; 
CMS Transmission Co. v. Argentine Rep. (CMS Decision), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, para. 472 (May 12, 2005), 14 ICSID Rep. 152 (2009). 
 108. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80 , at 396–402.396-402. 
 109. CMS Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 120–27, 129–36, 
144–49. 
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treaty clause—which in their view was a “primary” rule 
obviating liability—to the secondary rule contained in the 
customary defense of necessity (which arguably does not 
eliminate liability even when properly invoked).110 
The second annulment decision, in Sempra, applied the 
dicta of the CMS decision and decided that the original Sempra 
panel manifestly exceeded its powers in applying the customary 
defense of necessity instead of the measures not precluded 
clause of the BIT.111 It annulled the award in its entirety.112 
The third annulment decision, in Enron, upheld the 
underlying finding that the measures not precluded clause of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be read in light of the 
customary defense of necessity.113 To this extent, the Enron 
annulment committee rejected both the dicta in the CMS 
annulment and the Sempra annulment ruling. However, the 
Enron annulment committee nonetheless annulled the 
underlying Enron award on a different ground. It found that 
the original panel had failed to apply the relevant law because 
it relied on the wrong reasons and the wrong evidence in 
rejecting Argentina’s customary defense of necessity.114 The 
Enron annulment committee ruled that the original panel did 
not address the meaning of the customary defense’s 
requirement that the state relying on the defense not have 
“contributed to the situation of necessity.”115 It found that the 
panel had erroneously relied on evidence presented by an 
economic expert who failed to address the underlying legal 
questions, such as whether the aspect of the defense requires 
the state to have been shown to be “blameworthy” for its 
conduct, “regardless of whether or not the State could have in 
any way foreseen that its conduct would contribute to a 
situation of necessity.”116 
All of these annulment rulings evince strongly sovereignty 
protective interpretations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. All three 
come up with striking and surprising conclusions in the context 
of a treaty that is, on all relevant matters, indistinguishable 
from the strongly investor-protective U.S. Model of 1984. 
 
 110. Id. paras. 130–33,130-33, 146.  
 111. Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 216–19, 221–22. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Enron Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, para. 356. 
 114. Id. paras. 368-95. 
 115. Id. paras. 385–94. 
 116. Id. para. 387. 
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Whether or not the annulment committees came to the proper 
conclusion—and, of course, this is doubtful given the 
differences among them—these decisions demonstrate that at 
least some investor-state arbitral decisions are also now 
serving to re-empower the state. These annulment rulings do so 
in three different ways. 
As indicated, the CMS annulment formally upheld the 
investor’s award. However, by going out of its way to severely 
criticize the legal merits of that award, the CMS annulment 
committee, consciously or not, made enforcement of the original 
award considerably more difficult. Whether or not the CMS 
annulment committee intended the result, the underlying 
award in this case (as well as others rendered against 
Argentina) have not been paid.117 As Koutoglidou’s paper 
reminds us, it is always hard to secure payment from an entity 
that enjoys sovereign immunity.118 Although ICSID awards are 
more enforceable than most international obligations, they are 
not immune from the fundamental weakness of all such 
obligations: namely, that enforcement rests in the end on the 
legitimacy of the obligation and a state’s desire to comply.119 By 
casting doubt on the legitimacy of the underlying award, the 
CMS annulment committee made it easier for Argentine 
authorities to justify their continued refusal to pay. This 
annulment decision, in effect, licensed Argentina’s continued 
civil disobedience. Indeed, even assuming that the Argentine 
authorities had been inclined to comply with the underlying 
award if it had survived the annulment process, the CMS 
annulment’s criticisms of the basis for the award renders the 
public payment of such an award by a democratically 
accountable body much more difficult to explain to Argentine 
taxpayers. The CMS annulment, in short, empowers state 
defiance of the law. 
The Sempra award defers to state sovereignty in a 
different way. Its controversial finding that what it deems to be 
 
 117. See, e.g., Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis 
and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
449, 469 (2007) (quoting Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of 
ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L ARBITRATION 1, 2 (2006)) (explaining that the 
Argentine Ministry of Economy has taken the position that all such awards 
are subject to local court review in Argentina because they are 
“‘unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable.’”).  
 118. Koutoglidou, supra note 30. 
 119. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 117, at 465–469; ;Baldwin, supra note 
117. 
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an erroneous interpretation of the measures not precluded 
clause constitutes a manifest “excess of powers,”120 and 
therefore requires annulment, threatens to turn the limited 
ICSID annulment process into a forum for full appellate review 
of the legal findings issued by original ICSID panels. This is, as 
is suggested by the CMS annulment ruling, not consistent with 
what the states agreed to pursuant to the ICSID Convention or 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT itself in reliance on that Convention.121 
Moreover, the Sempra annulment’s finding that the measures 
not precluded clause does not mean the customary defense of 
necessity,122 appears to be a re-interpretation of the treaty in 
light of what one of the state parties now argues is the case, 
instead of an effort to give effect to what both of the parties 
intended when they concluded their agreement in 1991.123 This 
is a highly contestable approach to treaty interpretation.124 
There does not appear to be any evidence that both parties 
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT share a common view of what should 
be the proper meaning of its measures not precluded clause 
even today. Of course, the traditional rules of treaty 
interpretation license resort to the “subsequent practice of the 
parties.”125 As the plural indicates, these rules do not license 
interpretation based on the current views of one of the treaty 
parties and those rules do not authorize treaty interpreters to 
speculate about what might be the views of both state parties 
in the absence of evidence. The apparent contemporary view of 
the U.S. Executive branch (as expressed in a letter written 
after the Argentina claims were submitted and in the course of 
another claim) was that a state party’s reliance on the 
measures not precluded clause of a U.S. BIT would render the 
underlying dispute inadmissible or non-justiciable since that 
 
 120.  Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision, 
para. 219 (June 29, 2010).  
 121.  CMS Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 135–36 (Sept. 25, 
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 251 (2009). 
 122.  Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 198–200, 208–
09. 
 123. Cf. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 427–440. 
 124. But see Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.AJIL 179 (2010) 
(proposing to “recalibrate the interpretative between states and tribunals” by 
increasing tribunals’ reliance on the subsequent practice of states even when 
that subsequent practice is in the context of other BITs or where the “common 
practice” of the states in question is determined by their separate practices). 
 125. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(a), May 31, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.  
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question was not subject to review by an arbitral body.126 
Although Argentina in the course of the proceedings discussed 
here also made the same claim, it accepted, in the Sempra case 
among others that arbitral tribunals have the power to 
examine whether Argentina’s invocation of necessity was in 
good faith.127 Interestingly, none of the tribunals, including on 
annulment, accepted either of these contentions by the United 
States or Argentina. None accepted the proposition that 
invocation of the measures not precluded clause renders an 
underlying dispute inadmissible or non-justiciable and none 
accepted the alternative argument that arbitral review was 
limited to an examination of whether a party invokes this 
clause in good faith.128 
The Sempra annulment committee’s interpretation of the 
relevant clause cannot therefore be justified on the basis of the 
subsequent practice of the parties. There is no evidence cited 
that both the United States and Argentina were of the entirely 
different view, which ultimately convinced the annulment 
committee, that the measures not precluded clause was a rule 
of lex specialis intended to depart from the ordinarily applicable 
rule, namely the customary defense of necessity (indeed, given 
the U.S. government’s position, expressed in BITs concluded 
after the U.S.-Argentina BIT, that the measures not precluded 
clause is wholly self-judging, that government apparently sees 
no need even today to take a position on that question). 
Moreover, there is an even more fundamental objection to 
the conclusion reached in the Sempra annulment. Even 
assuming that the state parties had reached a common 
understanding concerning the meaning of the measures not 
precluded clause in their treaty, it is very doubtful that such a 
view, nowhere expressed as an amendment to the treaty or 
 
 126. Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para. 382 (quoting part 
of a letter from James H. Thessin, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser and 
Designated Agency Ethics Official, United States Department of State, to 
Abraham D. Sofaer, dated Sept. 15, 2006 (stating: “notwithstanding the 
decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the position of the U.S. Government 
is that the essential security language in our FCN treaties and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties is self-judging, i.e., only the party itself is competent to 
determine what is in its own essential security interests.”).).  
 127. See, e.g., Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 297–
298.  
 128. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 417–26; see also José E. 
Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty 
v. Argentina, Y.B. INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL. 2010-2011 (2011), available at 
investmentclaims.com. 
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licensed as a binding understanding that can bind investment 
arbitrators in the U.S.-Argentina BIT (as compared to the 
NAFTA for example),129 should retroactively be applied such as 
to affect the rights of a third party investor who relies on a 
different original understanding when making its 
investment.130 For these reasons, the Sempra annulment ruling 
wrongly empowers the state through a retroactive re-
interpretation not clearly endorsed by the subsequent practice 
of the parties and also derogates from the rights that the treaty 
originally accorded to a third party. 
The Enron annulment ruling may be the most expansive 
precedent in deference to sovereignty of the three. While that 
decision avoids some of the flaws committed by the CMS or 
Sempra annulment committees, it potentially expands the 
scope of the customary defense of necessity. That defense, as is 
well known, applies to all international obligations not subject 
to special lex specialis rules.131 Although the precise rationale 
of the Enron findings on this point is not altogether clear, the 
annulment committee suggested that the underlying panel had 
not clarified what amounts to “fault” in the context of 
contribution to the situation of necessity.132 It further faulted 
that tribunal for not answering questions such as the following: 
“Must the conduct of the State in question be deliberate (in the 
sense of being deliberately intended to bring about the 
situation of necessity), or does it suffice that the conduct was 
reckless or negligent, or is some even lesser degree of fault 
sufficient?”133 It also accused the original tribunal of “cursory 
 
 129. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1131(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (authorizing the parties to issue binding interpretations of 
the treaty). 
 130. Even Roberts, who generally supports the use of states’ subsequent 
practices in the context of interpreting BITs, expresses doubts about whether 
practices that effectively amend a treaty undertaken after an investor has 
made its investment, should be permitted to detrimentally affect the settled 
expectations of the investor through retroactive application. See Roberts, 
supra note 124 , at 212-13 (arguing that late and unreasonable interpretations 
should only have prospective effect). 
 131. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S 
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES 178–186, 306–308 (2002) (commenting on the ILC’s articles 
25, “Necessity,” and 55, “Lex specialis”).  
 132. Enron Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment Decision, 
paras. 385–
90 (July 30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.
pdf.  
 133. Id. para. 389. 
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reasoning,” insofar as it accepted the testimony of an economic 
expert for the conclusion that “Argentina’s own ‘misguided’ 
policies contributed to the magnitude of the economic crisis,”134 
and indicated that an economist’s conclusion was not relevant 
to a determination that, as a matter of law, the state had 
contributed to the situation of necessity.135 
What is most surprising about the Enron annulment is 
that it does not appear that any of these interpretative 
questions were raised by the litigants themselves and argued 
before the original panel. The Enron annulment appears to 
make new law insofar as it finds that economic evidence cannot 
serve to justify an application of a legal rule, namely the 
customary defense of necessity.136 That annulment ruling also 
fails to address clearly the issue of burden of proof. Prior to this 
decision, most assumed that the burden of proving an 
affirmative defense like the customary defense of necessity 
rested on the party invoking it.137 (This would appear to be all 
the more the case to the extent the Enron annulment 
committee is suggesting that the motivation for the underlying 
Argentine actions that allegedly contributed to the situation of 
necessity might be relevant since Argentina is presumably in 
the best position to prove whether its contributing actions were 
negligent or deliberate.) The Enron annulment, however, says 
nothing about the traditional allocation of burden of proof but 
the committee was apparently not swayed by the fact that 
Argentina failed to prove that it had not contributed to the 
situation of necessity. This suggests that, for the annulment 
committee, the burden of proof on this point rests with the 
claimant. Finally, the Enron annulment says nothing about the 
contention, based on the ILC’s articles of state responsibility, 
that even assuming the defense of necessity had been properly 
invoked, this does not absolve the invoking state from any 
 
 134. Id. para. 392. 
 135. See id. para. 393 (explaining that other evidence besides the expert’s 
testimony should have been taken into consideration when making the 
determination that the state had contributed to the situation of necessity).  
 136. See id. paras. 391–393 (“While an economist might regard a State’s 
economic policies as misguided, and might conclude that such policies led to or 
amplified the effects of an economic crisis, that would not of itself necessarily 
mean that as matter of law, the State had ‘contributed to the situation of 
necessity’ such as to preclude reliance on the principle of necessity under 
customary international law.”).  
 137. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 473.  
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financial liability otherwise due.138 The fact that the financial 
award was annulled suggests that this annulment committee 
assumed otherwise.  
Like the Sempra annulment, the Enron annulment 
empowers states by giving them a second bite at the apple 
despite the limited basis for annulment permitted under 
ICSID.139 More troubling is the possibility that the Enron 
annulment may empower all states by making it easier to get 
out of most of their international obligations. The Enron 
annulment implies that the defense of necessity, formerly seen 
as an exceedingly and purposely narrow excuse that has to be 
affirmatively proven by those seeking to evade their 
international obligations and a defense that does not, in any 
case, absolve states from liability otherwise due, may be far 
more expansive in scope and effect as well as easier to invoke 
than was previously assumed—including by the International 
Law Commission when it drafted Article 25 codifying that 
defense.140 
These arbitral rulings, among the few that have proceeded 
through the full ICSID annulment process, demonstrate that 
investor-state dispute settlement, long disparaged for its 
supposedly “pro-investor” bias, ultimately may bend to the will 
of those who built it, namely states. Investment arbitration was 
sold on the premise that, like U.S. passage of its Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act,141 neutral apolitical adjudication 
would displace the politicized alternative, namely espousal of 
investor claims by the U.S. State Department.142 The Argentina 
 
 138. See CRAWFORD, supra note 131, at 189–190. 
 139. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S 159, 4 
I.L.M. 532 (permitting annulment if the original “Tribunal was not properly 
constituted; . . . [it] manifestly exceeded its powers; . . . there was corruption 
on the part of a member of the Tribunal; . . . there has been a serious 
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; . . . or the award has failed to 
state the reasons on which it is based.”). 
 140. See CRAWFORD, supra note 131, at 178–186; see also Alvarez & 
Khamsi, supra note 80, at 396–404, 427–440, 455–60 (discussing the 
understanding and application of necessity under customary international 
law). 
 141. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583 §§ 
1602–1605, 90 Stat. 2891, 2892 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1605).  
 142. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The 
Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 159, at 160–61 (1993) 
(“[T]he function of the BIT was to insulate private investment from politically 
driven foreign or domestic public policy—in effect, to depoliticize investment 
matters by placing the protection of private investment under an apolitical 
ALVAREZ - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:06 PM 
250 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
annulments—like some of those under the NAFTA involving 
the United States as respondent143—suggest that this was 
naïve. Politics does not stop at the door to ICSID. Investment 
arbitrators, which, after all, invariably include one appointed 
by the respondent state, do not necessarily ignore the political 
concerns of those who could, if sufficiently dissatisfied with the 
result, deploy their powers of exit and voice to undermine the 
entire edifice of investor-state dispute settlement. These 
arbitral decisions and possibly others can best be explained by 
one salient political reality: in the wake of the latest global 
economic crisis, BIT parties, including the United States, want 
discretion to respond to such crises through any means 
necessary.144 The state parties to investment protection 
agreements—and at least some investment arbitrators—appear 
to view the Argentina crisis cases through different eyes. They 
are now saying to themselves, “there but for the grace of God go 
I.” 
A number of recent investor-state arbitral decisions 
confirm the trend towards “re-balancing.” Another recent 
decision, again involving Argentina, reads the GATT XX 
jurisprudence, complete with its proportionality analysis, into 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, to the benefit of the respondent 
state.145 Moreover, even the underlying awards criticized or 
annulled in CMS, Sempra and Enron, suggested that a 
successful claim of expropriation requires an act that is 
effectively a government seizure of the investors’ entire 
property and not merely a decrease in the profitability of an 
enterprise.146 Those awards also suggested some sensitivity to 
the needs of states; even those decisions indicated that 
 
legal regime.”). For a critique of this common justification for investor-state 
arbitration, see Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in 
Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration (Oct. 1, 2010). 
 143. For criticism of the decision rendered in Loewen v. United States, see 
Don Wallace, Jr., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial of Justice: Loewen 
v. US and Chattin v. Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES 
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (Todd Weiler, ed., 2005). 
 144. Thus, concerns over whether U.S. investment agreements would 
adversely impact the United States government’s and other states’ powers to 
prevent or mitigate future financial crises was one of the issues that divided 
the U.S. Department of State’s subcommittee charged with reviewing the 
current U.S. model BIT. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 101. 
 145. Continental Casualty v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 
Award (Sept. 5, 2008), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyA
ward.pdf. For a critique of this decision, see Alvarez & Brink, supra note 128. 
 146. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 394. 
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Argentina’s economic crisis and its impact needed to be taken 
into account for purposes of determining the amount of liability 
imposed on the state.147 Other investment arbitrations seem to 
be incorporating or relying implicitly on a form of 
proportionality reasoning that balances the rights of investors 
with those of the state, including with respect to applying the 
guarantee to accord investors fair and equitable treatment.148 
Some recent arbitral decisions suggest, for example, that in 
determining whether government action violates the legitimate 
expectations of the investor, “the host State’s legitimate right 
subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest must be taken into consideration as well.”149 Moreover, 
within the NAFTA, now subject to the NAFTA parties’ 
interpretation indicating that the FET guarantee in that treaty 
means nothing more than what aliens were entitled to under 
the customary rule assuring the international minimum 
standard of treatment, one recent decision, Glamis Gold, limits 
that right to the bare bones protections protected by denial of 
justice claims circa 1927.150 In light of such rulings, fears that 
investor claims under BITs and FTAs would dramatically 
reduce the capacity of states to regulate appear overstated.151 
III. SOVEREIGNTY REVISITED 
There is a broader context to these developments. The 
efforts to re-balance the rights of sovereigns vis-à-vis foreign 
 
 147. See id. at 403–04, 471; see also Alvarez & Brink supra note 128. 
 148. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: 
Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (2010). 
 149. See Saluka BV v. Czech Republic ¶ 305 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.
pdf.  
 150. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL Award ¶ 21 (2009) 
(agreeing with United States’ contentions that FET remains subject to the 
standard articulated in the Neer v. Mexico (4 R. Int’l Arb. 1926) case, but 
suggesting that that standard, requiring a demonstration of “egregious” 
conduct by the state, has evolved over time). But see Merrill & Ring Forestry 
L.P. and Canada, ICSID Award, ¶¶ 190–213190-213 (Mar. 31, 2010) (finding 
that the Neer standard was no longer the applicable customary international 
law standard with respect to the treatment of aliens in relation to business, 
trade and investment). 
 151. Cf. Osgoode Hall School of Law, Public Statement on the International 
Investment Regime, http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/ 
(discussing “[A] shared concern for the harm done to the public welfare by the 
international investment regime, as currently structured, especially its 
hampering of the ability of governments to act for their people in response to 
the concerns of human development and environmental sustainability.”). 
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investors increasingly evident in the text of BITs, national 
laws, and even some arbitral awards, coincides with a much 
chastened view of the “Washington Consensus.”152 Much of the 
world has lost faith in the policy prescriptions that seem to 
underlie BITs of the first generation; we have lost faith in 
deregulation, privatization, the un-abashed protection of 
property, and wholly unrestricted trade and capital flows. This 
formula for state disempowerment in economic affairs has been 
undermined by perceptions that it has not served to raise all 
boats as anticipated. Empirical work casts doubt on whether 
adherence to the formula—and entering into investment 
protection agreements to evince a creditable commitment to 
following it—produces enhanced capital flows or whether, even 
when such capital comes, it will produce the sustained 
economic development and beneficial spillovers anticipated.153 
Columbia’s Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard’s Dani Rodrik, among 
others, have seeded doubts about neo-liberal growth strategies 
and whether history’s success stories—from the Asian Tigers to 
the turn of the century industrializing United States—truly 
adhered to them.154 Others have emphasized the negative 
externalities often accompanying incoming capital flows, 
including more unequal income distribution, politically 
disruptive dislocations of people, and adverse social or 
environmental effects.155 Some have suggested that properly 
managing these challenges require actions that not anticipated 
 
 152. For an understanding of the Washington Consensus, see, e.g., John 
Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus (Fundación CIDOB, 
2004), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. 
 153. See generally Lisa Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES 
ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE 
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009) (collection of studies 
considering the impact of BITs on the flow of foreign investment and on 
economic development); José E. Alvarez, The NAFTA’s Investment Chapter 
and Mexico, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN RELATION TO THE 
FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LEGAL CULTURE (R. 
Dolzer, et al. eds., 2006) (surveying the reasons why the NAFTA’s investment 
chapter continues to elicit mixed views even as foreign investment flows into 
Mexico have increased). 
 154. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002) (criticizing the promulgation of the “Washington Consensus”); Dani 
Rodrik, Growth Strategies, in Handbook of Economic Growth (P. Aghion & 
S.NN. Durlauf eds., (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), available at 
http://econ2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ502/tesfatsion/GrowthStrategies.DRo
drik.GrowthHB2005.pdf (arguing that pursuit of the Washington Consensus 
model has not produced economic development as anticipated). 
 155. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 153, at 250. 
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or even prohibited by some BITs.156 In any case, handling such 
externalities requires more, not less, government. 
Of course, the global economic meltdown, and the 
perception that this time it started with us, has also 
undermined confidence in Western states’ and international 
financial institutions’ advice on how best to achieve “good 
governance.” IMF conditionality is viewed with more 
skepticism today. This is particularly true for those who think, 
as do many Argentineans, that IMF conditions led to the over 
40 ICSID claims (face value said to be over $80 billion) against 
their country.157 The age is past when the United States can 
get away with handing out its Model BIT circa 1984 to 
developing nations while saying, as early BIT negotiators did, 
“here are the minimum conditions for a successful economy.”158 
The United States’ evolving BIT sends a very different 
message; it says that even the United States is experimenting 
with the balance between the market and regulation and is no 
longer confident that there is a one-size-fits-all formula for 
success. 
The chastened U.S. BIT program may be part of the 
historical dialectic between champions of the market and 
regulation described by Karl Polanyni in his 1944 classic, “The 
Great Transformation”, or much more recently, by Amy 
Chua.159 The challenge to the turn to the market marked by the 
 
 156. This may be the case, for example, to the extent a state seeks to 
restrict foreign investors to particular sectors or particular regions or seeks to 
impose on foreign investors performance requirements (such as requiring the 
transfer for technology) barred by certain BITs or FTAs. 
 157. W.W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability 
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. OF WTO & 
INT’L HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, 199, 200 (2008); Aktion Finanzplatz 
International Conference on Illegitimate Debts Berne, Aktion Finanzplatz 
Schweiz, Argentina 1976–2007: The Paradigmatic Case of an Extraordinarily 
Legitimate Debt (Oct. 3–4, 2007), 
http://www.aktionfinanzplatz.ch/pdf/kampagnen/illegitime/Keene_handout_en.
pdf. 
 158. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and 
Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501 (1998) (discussing “the extent to which BITs 
contribute to the creation of a liberal investment regime and the place of BITs 
in economic development”). 
 159.  The 1984 U.S. Model BIT can be seen as the embodiment of Polanyi’s 
concept of utopian market liberalism, while the 2004 U.S. Model embodies his 
“inevitable” protective countermovement to restore the “proper” role of 
government in regulating the market. See generally, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Foreword to Karl Polanyi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2d ed. 2001) 
(“suggest[ing] that the challenge facing the global community today is whether 
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rise of BITs is now evident in, for example, scholarly and civil 
society challenges to the International Finance Corporation’s 
advice (including with respect to its indices for “progress” 
produced in its annual “Doing Business” reports which 
confidently rank countries on how business-friendly the 
national rule of law is).160 Eroding confidence in the global 
structures for economic governance—and the perception that 
these failed to prevent the latest global economic crisis and 
were not particularly relevant to our painful recovery from 
it161—has resulted in a more humble and slightly more 
transparent IMF, no longer as confident about having the 
answer. That institution, charged with advancing “good 
governance,” now seems preoccupied with figuring out how best 
to apply “good governance” to itself. Notably, the IMF’s on-
going efforts to change its weighted voting procedures are also 
a form of sovereign empowerment as it is obvious that these 
will give more clout to distinct states, such as Brazil and 
India.162 Of course, the trend in favor of greater sovereign 
“policy space” in the investment regime finds echoes in older 
demands for the re-calibration of the WTO to permit its 
adjudicators to have greater discretion to respect states’ 
capacity to comply with their non-trade obligations, including 
those demanded by the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (such as to ensure the right to water or 
health).163 That trend is also a component of those regimes that 
remain dominated by national laws with extraterritorial effect, 
 
it can redress these imbalances before it is too late”). See also Amy Chua, 
WORLD ON FIRE (2002) (arguing that national cycles oscillating between 
efforts to privatize and to renew government economic intervention are driven 
by and have differing effects on minorities within certain countries); Amy 
Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link between Markets and 
Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995) (challenging 
“the prevailing assessment of the historical “lessons” of privatization.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Kevin Davis and Michael Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: 
The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1095, 1096 
(2007). 
 161. See, e.g., David Zaring, International institutional Performance in 
Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 475 (2010). 
 162. See, e.g., Final Report, Comm. on IMF Governance Reform 14, Mar. 
24, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.
pdf. 
 163. See generally Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AJIL 1 
(2002) (discussing the positives of revisiting questions regarding facing “[a] 
vast array of potential recipes for linkage to particular nontrade issues, as 
well as cautionary tales against such linkage.”). 
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such as what David Gerber’s “global competition” regime.164 
What Hollywood would call “the revenge of the state” is 
suggested, of course, by the revival of—if not nostalgia for—old-
fashioned government regulation, including in the United 
States. To the chagrin of the Tea Party movement, the actions 
of the Obama Administration suggest a belated backlash to the 
Reagan years, which memorably portrayed “government as the 
problem.” The touted revival of government regulation in the 
United States preceded Obama, of course, and included the 
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,165 but it garnered public notice 
given governments’ responses worldwide to the global economic 
crisis. The consequential impact on governmental involvement 
in the financial sector is particularly stark. Katharina Pistor 
points out how, starting with a series of transactions that 
began in the fall of 2007 that involved turning to sovereign 
wealth funds to secure fresh capital, the largest financial 
intermediaries have become increasingly dominated by 
governments.166 She reports that at least as of 2009, the largest 
stakeholder of the following banks was the United States 
government: AIG (with an 85 percent stake), Bank of America 
(6), and Citigroup (32).167 The second largest stakeholder in 
Citigroup was also governmental: the government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation with an 11 percent stake.168 The Qatar 
Investment Authority was the leading stakeholder in Barclays 
(12) and Credit Swiss (8), while the UK government was the 
leading owner of HBOS (43), Lloyds (75), RBS (75).169 Pistor 
also notes the obvious: the global crisis has expanded the role of 
the home government of these banks from regulator (including 
as part of corporate governance as with respect to executive 
compensation) to that of capital provider or investor of last 
 
 164. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW, MARKETS, AND 
GLOBALIZATION (2010) (presenting how “decision-makers in many parts of the 
world recognize the potential value of economic competition and increasingly 
seek to protect it from private restraints.”). 
 165. Sabarnes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 166. Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks and Governments 
in the Global Crisis: Towards a New Governance of Global Finance, 10 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. Rev. 333, 335-36 (2009) (involving turning to sovereign wealth 
funds to secure fresh capital, making the largest financial intermediaries 
become increasingly dominated by governments). 
 167. Id. at 336, tbl. 1. 
 168. Id. at 341. 
 169. Id. at 336, tbl. 1. 
ALVAREZ - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:06 PM 
256 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
resort.170 She notes that even without formal voting rights, the 
government owners of these banks are in a position to exert 
substantial leverage over them and perhaps even over the 
home governments of these banks.171 
Whether we (or governments) should be pleased or 
distressed by these developments is not the subject of this 
essay. It may very well be true that old-fashioned 
protectionism—including exaggerated concerns over the “out-
sourcing” of jobs—lies behind U.S. policy-makers’ concerns 
over, for example, the state-owned enterprises of China. What 
is clear is that governments’ efforts to re-secure their borders 
and replenish their regulatory prowess responds at least in 
part to the fact that the state is making a comeback through 
the return of state-owned enterprises and the renewed clout of 
impressively endowed sovereign wealth funds, whether based 
in Norway, Qatar or Singapore. The changes to the investment 
regime respond in part to doubts about whether we should 
treat these entities—or long established Chinese owned 
enterprises—as if they were no different from privately owned 
multinational enterprises operating for commercial gain.172 We 
are not as sure as we once were whether we should welcome all 
foreigners so long as they come with lots of cash. 
What this means is that governments are empowering 
themselves along multiple dimensions. They are, as noted, re-
entering the economic marketplace. Despite widespread 
privatization, they still or now control many enterprises that 
seek to invest and direct the investment strategies of SWFs. At 
the same time, they are shoring up their regulatory abilities to 
better protect themselves from other governments’ exercises in 
“state capitalism.”  
To the proverbial “man armed with a hammer,” much 
resembles a nail. To this author, the return of the state with 
respect to finance and investment appears to be part of a 
greater trend in favor of empowering the state that is occurring 
outside international economic law as well. It is now 
commonplace that the “war on terror” has given states a highly 
persuasive new rationale to enhance their powers—whether 
 
 170. Id. at 332–44; 349–50. 
 171. Id. at 343. 
 172. See, e.g., Charles Kovacs, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Much Ado About 
Some Money, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/sovereign-wealth-funds-
much-ado-about-some-money; Veljko Fotak and William Megginson, Are SWFs 
Welcome Now?, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/are-swfs-welcome-now.    
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with respect to its use of force (as in Afghanistan and through 
drones) or through enhanced surveillance over individuals and 
organizations. September 11th has created a vast new 
battleground with respect to states and human rights where 
the sites of contestation are not always subject to easy answers. 
Henkin’s “S” word seems less curse word than blessing if “S” 
claims to be protecting us from non-state actors armed with 
WMDs.173 In human rights regimes as well as the investment 
regime, states are increasingly resorting to their “security” 
needs as ultimate trumps over the rights of non-state actors. 
Whether we like the comparison or not, there are parallels 
between these arguments—whether made in ICSID or before 
UN human rights treaty bodies—and Carl Schmitt’s notorious 
“law of the exception.”174 
At least when it comes to security and perhaps more 
generally, the Lotus presumption—states can act unless 
explicitly forbidden—may be making a comeback.175 Charles 
Tilly famously noted that “war made the state,”176 and even our 
Supreme Court has suggested that the U.S. civil war made the 
United States.177 Threats to security, real or imagined, 
empower governments. Today, as is suggested by Argentina’s 
 
 173. Notably, the “S” word may actually serve to protect human rights 
when the threat to these emerges from institutions of global governance, such 
as the UN Security Council. See, e.g., Yassin Abdullah Kadi and al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council of the European Union, European Court 
of Justice, Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P 2008 E.C.R. X (hereinafter Kadi). 
For some the European Court of Justice’s Kadi decision is an implicit judicial 
affirmation that the European Union is now sufficiently “state-like” or 
“sovereign” that its institutions, like the U.S. Supreme Court, can serve as a 
bulwark against international law when it (or international organizations 
acting under international law’s authority) threatens “constitutional” values. 
See Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International 
Legal Order after Kadi, 51 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (2009) (comparing the Kadi 
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Medellin).  
 174. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 10 (1922) (G. Schweb trans. 2005). See also DAVID 
DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW, LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 
(2006). 
 175. This may even be true within the venerated International Court of 
Justice. See, e.g., Declaration by Judge Simma, Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 
I.C.J. 141 (July 22). 
 176. Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State-Making, in 
THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 42 (Charles Tilly 
ed. 1975).  
 177. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“. . . it has taken a 
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they 
created a nation,” J. Holmes).  
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increasingly successful arguments before arbitral bodies, a 
state’s “security” includes its economic security. Perhaps an 
embracive notion of security and states’ desire to be free to deal 
with all threats to it, more than any other factor, is serving to 
re-make the investment regime—just as it appears to be 
transforming other international regimes, including that 
governing the use of force, the powers of the UN Security 
Council, or the rules governing military occupation.178 
Once we start appreciating how states empower 
themselves, scholarly projects seeking to correct the flaws of 
global governance regimes that we find take on a somewhat 
different meaning. The many flaws in global governance may 
be conscious (and successful) efforts by states or groups of 
states to avoid supra-national regulation. They may not be 
simply failings of the international legal imagination. Perhaps 
fragmentation dilemmas among international regimes are the 
product of forum-shifting/shopping by empowered states whose 
interests are served by fragmented law.179 If so, these may be 
all the more difficult to remedy. On the flip side, perhaps some 
of the things we commend as “new forms of global governance” 
may be something else when viewed through the “wrong” end of 
the telescope—and we see them as exercises of state power.180 
 
 178. See generally, José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law 
Revisited, 97 AJIL 873 (2003) ([S]urvey[ing] the recent practice of the Council 
to argue that, despite that body’s refusal to give explicit approval to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in advance, worries about the hegemonic capture of the 
Security Council (along with other forms of global HIL) should not be 
relegated to science fiction”). For a concrete example, see, e.g., Ellen 
Nakashima, Blair Says U.S. May Target Americans, Terrorism, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 4, 2010 (quoting U.S. Director of National Intelligence who asserted that 
the U.S. government can kill even U.S. nationals abroad if they are involved in 
terrorist activities). 
 179. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New 
Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007) (“[A]rgu[ing] that the problem of fragmentation is 
more serious than is commonly assumed because it operates to sabotage the 
evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international regulatory 
system and to undermine the reputation of international law for integrity.”). 
 180. Jean Cohen argues, for example, that the morphing of international 
organizations into global governance institutions does not herald the taming of 
sovereignty as much as the instrumentalization of these institutions by 
powerful nations. Cohen challenges the view that the world is steadily 
advancing towards to a progressive, cosmopolitan order without sovereigns, 
but argues instead that our global governance institutions authorize new 
hierarchies and gradations of sovereignty, citing examples such as the 
Security Council’s counter-terrorism “legislation.” Jean L. Cohen, Whose 
Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, 18 ETH. & INT’L. AFF. 
(2004/2005). 
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That global governance regimes can manifest the “international 
rule of law” and the interests of sovereigns should not surprise 
us. The decision to expand the trade regime to encompass 
intellectual property, after all, is commonly seen as a victory for 
global regulation and the rule of law—as well as a controversial 
exercise in hegemonic international law.181 In terms of the 
papers presented at this conference, perhaps we should see the 
G20, for example, as both a new form of global governance and 
as revival of a (very old)”Concert of Europe.”182 
Recognizing the continuing role of sovereignty has value. 
As noted, it improves our descriptions of reality. It enables us 
to see things as they are and not as we would like them to be. It 
is also likely to improve our policy prescriptions. Marian 
Pardo’s examination of Ecuador’s distinct approaches to 
privatization, for example, suggests that all too often we 
international lawyers wrongly assume that a problem is solved 
once a treaty is concluded or an international organization is 
established and we fail to consider how the purpose of the 
treaty or of the organization might be altered, sometimes 
dramatically, given what states do by way of implementation. 
Pardo’s sovereignty-focused work connects with other 
scholarship indicating that national institutions, practices and 
laws, and not only the form or structure of global regulation, 
may determine whether efforts at international regulation or 
adjudication succeed. Work by Laurence Helfer and Karen 
Alter on the mixed experiences of the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice, which was modeled on the European Court of Justice, 
to cite another example, provides a sharp reminder of the 
continued relevance of the states—and differing cultural and 
legal traditions—in which supra-national institutions are 
embedded.183 Theirs is a sharp rebuke to those who believe that 
there is a standard global law toolbox containing mostly 
European models that can be deployed across the planet to 
 
 181. See Ruth Rikowski, A Marxist Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property 
Rights, 4 POL’Y FUT. IN EDUC. 396, 407 (2006) (“[E]xamin[ing] the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).”). For a comparable argument involving the 
“legislative” actions of the UN Security Council, see Alvarez, supra note 178 at 
873.      
 182. Compare Kelly & Cho, supra note 26, with Zaring, supra note 27. 
 183. Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice 
and Its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patterns in The 
Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 871 (2009). 
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yield comparable results. Grounding the “transnational legal 
process” in, among other things, the actions and reactions of 
receiving states, the demands of their domestic elites, and local 
structures for governance is precisely the point as well of 
Gregory Shaffer’s recent work.184 All of these are concrete 
examples of why the return of the state matters. Paying 
attention to the continuing role of sovereigns may make us 
more effective builders of regimes enabling global governance.  
IV. CAVEATS 
My “return of the state” should not be misunderstood. I am 
not suggesting that all states have been equally empowered, 
even within the changing investment regime. Sovereign 
equality, if it ever existed, has not miraculously returned. A 
more proper, but less catchy, title for this essay might be “the 
return of some states.” The fact that an economic power like the 
United States is leading the drive to “re-balance” the 
investment regime is no accident. Moreover, even those states 
that are re-balancing their BITs are not necessarily doing so in 
the same way or to the same degree. Although many states are 
emulating the sovereignty-enhancing aspects of the post 2004 
U.S. Model BIT, not all states will enhance their relative 
powers over investors using the same tools. Some, like China, 
may decide to reserve greater policy discretion over their 
exchange rates or their ability to allocate foreign investors to 
particular parts of the country, for example. Other states may 
not be able to assert their own sovereign preferences in quite 
the same way as the Chinese or the United States. Many 
African states will likely remain parties to older much more 
pro-investor BITs based on models comparable to those of the 
U.S. Model BIT of 1984. Not all states will be able to deploy 
their “exit and voice” options equally, whether within the 
investment regime or in other international regimes. Despite 
its multilateral aspirations and effects, the international 
investment regime remains subject to bilateral leverage. Inter-
state power dynamics will, as always, continue to determine 
which state gets a chance to adapt a new BIT model, re-
negotiate its old BITs, ignore unfavorable arbitral rulings, or 
leave ICSID. Nor are the political dynamics in investment 
arbitrations likely to benefit all respondent states equally. 
 
 184. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: 
Opportunities and Constraints, (IILJ Working Paper 2010/4, 2010) available at 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2010-4.Shaffer.pdf. 
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The claim here should not be confused with those made by 
those who disparage the power or worth of international law. 
The changes to the U.S. Model BIT over time reflect, on the 
contrary, the power of international law and its remedies. The 
U.S. and other states are engaging in “re-balancing” the 
investment regime precisely because they are afraid of the 
political and legal consequences of investor-state dispute 
settlement. One does not deploy exit and voice against a regime 
that has no relevance. Nor should my claims about the United 
States’ role in leading the sovereign backlash to the investment 
regime be conflated with U.S. resistance to other international 
legal regimes. While some U.S. critics of investor-state 
arbitration may be hostile to all forms of supra-national 
adjudication, many draw distinctions based on subject matter 
or the perceived threat to “democratic governance” posed by 
distinct international regimes. Indeed, the leading NGO voices 
against the international investment regimes based in the 
United States are far more likely to support strongly 
sovereignty-intrusive regimes if these concern the protection of 
human rights or the environment. 
Changing attitudes toward the investment regime within 
the U.S. government reflect, more than anything else, the fact 
that the United States, which has long been the world’s leading 
capital exporter and its leading importer, now faces the serious 
threat of suit from foreign investors within its borders. Other 
states, including those who are strong supporters of 
international law and international legal regimes, such as 
Canada, are reacting the same way. The global backlash 
against the international investment regime has little to do 
with U.S. political attitudes towards international regimes—
and are not likely to change dramatically as between the Bush 
and Obama Administrations.185 It also has little, if anything, to 
do with the United States’ arguably declining status as a super-
power. The United States shares its status as capital 
importer/exporter with many others, including economic super-
powers such as China. That both the United States and China 
are reacting to this reality by changing their respective 
investment treaties demonstrates the enduring power of the 
reciprocal application of international law. 
The examples of state empowerment discussed here are not 
signposts indicating the end of history. The return of the state 
 
 185. Indeed, nearly all of the changes to the U.S. Model BIT from 1984–
2004 described here occurred during the Bush Administration.  
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does not mean that renewed efforts to regulate internationally 
on economic or other matters will not occur. On the contrary, as 
noted, the return of the state may be a cyclical turn in a never-
ending dialectic. Indeed, some of the developments noted in 
this essay—such as the expanding power of SWFs—are likely 
to lead to new efforts by states to protect themselves at the 
international level. SWFs may assert untoward powers vis-à-
vis countries in which they invest. Although SWFs are 
examples of state empowerment, the United States is not 
empowered by Norway’s or Qatar’s SWF. The existence of 
powerful SWFs and other state-run ventures is likely to lead to 
new ventures to cooperate internationally—as appears to be 
occurring as guidelines emerge with respect to SWFs.186 
My “return of the state” describes reality but does not 
celebrate it. While some lawyers, such as human rights 
advocates, have tended to assume that “the erosion of 
sovereignty is a bell-weather of progress,”187 no such claim is 
made here. Nor do I claim the opposite. Perhaps restoring 
greater sovereign policy space is a needed corrective measure 
within the investment regime, perhaps not. My simple point is 
that both critics and proponents of the investment, and other 
international, regimes need to recognize empowerment when it 
occurs – and must take it into account in their assessments and 
in their proposals for reform. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We live in an age of such massive and continuous change 
that announcements of new paradigms are routinely expected. 
This essay is bound to disappoint. It adheres to a very old 
paradigm indeed: Westphalia. It’s obvious target are those 
many scholars who have argued, for over a decade, that the 
state is “withering away,” is “waning,” is in “decline,” “retreat,” 
is already gone, or perhaps was always a “myth.”188 Those 
 
 186. See, e.g., The Santiago Principles, Elaborated by the International 
Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds in Nov. 2008 Based on earlier 
work undertaken by the IMF, http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm; see 
also OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Countries, 
June 4–5,4-5, 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/14/41816692.pdf.  
 187. See Karima Bennoune, ‘Sovereignty vs. Suffering’? Re-examining 
Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EJIL 243, 243 
(2002). 
 188. For articles making these arguments see, e.g., Eli Lauterpacht, 
Sovereignty–Myth or Reality?, 73 INT’L. AFF. 131 (1997); Christoph Schreuer, 
The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for 
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political scientists and lawyers have been a tad premature in 
declaring the death of the state. Perhaps some of them have 
confused their normative agenda with reality. Perhaps some 
have seen “global governance” as a purely binary proposition. 
Whatever the reason, they are wrong. The state is changing, as 
it always has, but it is not extinct. Indeed, even with respect to 
so-called “failed states,” the international community typically 
seeks to restore the status quo. In such cases, we try to re-
create something that resembles a state because no one knows 
what to do with something that is not a state or part of one.189 
The Westphalian system may be a blink of an eye in the scope 
of human history but we are living in its time. No one 
unfortunate enough to be outside Koskenneimi’s “wonderful 
artificiality” of statehood190believes that it is a myth. Ask a 
Palestinian. As Michael Walzer put it in a recent lecture, only 
those lucky enough to live in a functioning state can afford to 
suggest that it is “withering away.”191 
At the same time, those of us working to improve the 
structures of global governance are not wasting our time. State 
power and global governance are not defining end points in a 
zero sum game. The Wimbledon case had it right. State power 
co-exists with and may be enhanced by global governance— 
even if sometimes the cyclical pendulum swings more towards 
one end.192 At times, global institutions like the UN Security 
 
International Law?, 4 EJIL 447 (1993); Weiss et. al, Sovereignty Under Siege: 
From Intervention to Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND WESTPAHALIA?: STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 87 (G. Lyons and M. 
Mastaduno, eds.1995); CAMILLERI & J. FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE 
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); Rosas, The 
Decline of Sovereignty: Legal Perspectives, in THE FUTURE OF THE NATION 
STATE IN EUROPE (Livonen, ed. 1993); Vincent Cable, What Future for the 
Nation State?, 124 DAEDALUS 23 (1995). See also Neil MacCormick, Beyond 
the Sovereign State, 56 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 189. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE 
FAILURE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
43-65 (2010). 
 190. Martti Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of States, 88 ASIL 
ANN. MEETING PROCEEDINGS 22 (1994). See also Benedict Kingsbury, 
Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EJIL 599 (1998) (arguing that “discarding 
sovereignty…will intensify inequality, weak[en] restraints on coercive 
intervention, dimini[sh] critical roles of the state as the locus of identify and 
an autonomous zone of politics, and redivid[e] the world into zones”, as 
between “liberal” and “non-liberal” states); Bennoune, supra note 187 at 243 
(arguing that sovereignty may sometimes serve to protect human rights). 
 191. Michael Walzer, Global and Local Justice, Straus Lecture at N.Y.U 
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nyustraus.org/events/PublicLecture_Walzer.html.  
 192. The dichotomous reasoning of those who have suggested that global 
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Council or the WTO Appellate Body empower some states more 
than others. This essay does not suggest that global governance 
is in decline or that attempts to make it better are futile. Its 
only claim is that the state continues to matter the most to our 
schemes for global law—as Grotius, on behalf of his state 
clients, would have been the first to acknowledge. 
 
 
 
governance efforts imply the withering away of the state is suggestive of the 
absolutist notions of sovereignty associated with Thomas Hobbes and Jean 
Boudin. Few international lawyers or political scientists should espouse such 
absolutist conceptions of statehood today. Such binary thinking ignores the 
fact that sovereign power lies along a spectrum. See José E. Alvarez, The 
Future of State Sovereignty, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW—FOR A 
REALISTIC UTOPIA (Antonio Cassese, ed. forthcoming 2011). Indeed, even 
Bodin contended that his “absolute” sovereign was somehow still bound by 
natural law, custom, and the need to respect property rights. JEAN BODIN, ON 
SOVEREIGNTY 44, 45 (Julian H. Franklin, ed. and trans. 1992). Interestingly, 
the United States’ adoption of a self-judging essential security exception in its 
post-2004 investment treaties (see Price, supra note 104) suggests a more 
absolutist vision of governments’ power to destroy rights to property than was 
entertained by even Bodin.  
